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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ronald Bird appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence following 
his conviction by a jury of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 16 years. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The following testimony was presented during Bird's jury trial: 
In the summer of 2009, when E.W. was four years old and her brother, T.W., 
was five years old, their parents would often find them visiting Bird at his house in 
their neighborhood. (Tr., p.229, L.23 - p.230, L.7; p.233, Ls.7-11.) E.W. called Bird, 
who was 78 years old at the time, the "Candy Guy" or the "Candy Man" because he 
would give the children candy in his kitchen while they visited inside his home. (Tr., 
p.233, Ls.12-18; p.363, L.21 - p.365, L.2; p.620, Ls.16-19.) 
According to E.W., one day when she was four years old she was in Bird's 
living room and her hand touched Bird's "pee-pee," which was her name for the part 
of a boy's body that goes "pee." (Tr., p.358, Ls.3-15; p.366, L.5 - p.368, L.14.) E.W. 
said that when she was in the bathroom in Bird's house, both her hand and her 
mouth touched Bird's "pee-pee." (Tr., p.368, L.15 - p.369, L.17.) E.W. explained 
that she did not want to touch "The Candy Man" or put her mouth on his "pee-pee," 
and that the latter act was Bird's idea and it made her feel sad when it happened. 
(Tr., p.368, Ls.7-14; p.369, Ls.15-17; p.374, Ls.6-24; 392, L.18 - p.393, L.6.) When 
the prosecutor asked E.W. if "The Candy Man" ever did anything to her pants, she 
said that he "[p]ulled them down[,]" which also made her feel sad. (Tr., p.373, Ls.17-
23.) 
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Bird testified on direct examination, in part, as follows: 
Q. And so I went in my bedroom, and the door didn't close tight 
like it should. And I was in my bedroom, and I had a pair of Levi's on. I 
just pulled them up. And she came walking into my bedroom, and she 
asked me "Do you have a wee-wee?" 
And I thought I misunderstood her. And then I asked her again, 
and she told me -- asked me the same question. 
So I told her "Yes." And I should have said "No." But I said 
"Yes." 
And she was about 3 or 4 feet to my left, and she came over 
real quick, put her hands in my shorts, and grabbed hold of my penis 
and twisted it. 
Q. And then tell the jury what happened after that. 
A And then I guess she went back into my living room or went 
home. 
Q. Did you spank her? 
A No. She just -- she left too quick. I couldn't do anything. 
Q. Okay. And so tell the jury the next time that she touched you. 
A I was in my living room that night. I had this pair of Levi's on I 
had just washed and dried. And they was wore out. But they was kind 
of tight on me, and I could only zip them up halfway. 
But I was laying [in a rocker] way back, and she came in and sat 
on my couch. She came through the kitchen and walked in the living 
room and sat on my couch and started watching TV, what I was 
watching. And I was leaning back in that chair, halfway laying down. 
And she came in and got ahold of the head of it and twisted it 
again. 
Q. And so did you spank her bum that time? 
A No. She went and sat back on the couch. 
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Q. And then what did you do? 
A I went over and -- I was going to teach her a lesson.l11 And I 
went over and pushed her over, and I started pulling her pants down 
about his far. 
And I started thinking in my mind "What am I doing? This is up 
to her parents to train her, not me. So I stopped right there. 
(Tr., p.630, L.15 - p.632, L.15 (explanation added).) 
Bird testified that he could have told a detective that another incident occurred 
in his bathroom with E.W. the day after the other incidents. (Tr., p.672, L.24 - p.673, 
L.13.) During cross-examination, Bird explained what E.W. did after she went into 
his bathroom while he was urinating, as follows: 
A. She asked me -- she said "Are you finished?" And she was 
right there -- standing right there, and she leaned over real quick and 
kissed the head of it. 
Q. And your penis was still exposed when you turned toward her, 
knowing that she was there in the bathroom; correct? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You didn't turn away from her -- when you knew -- realized that 
she was there because she said "Are you done yet?" you didn't turn 
away from her and zip your pants up; correct? 
A. No, I never. I don't know why I never. There's a lot of things I 
could have done and should have done, but I never. I wasn't expecting 
that from her, period. 
Q. And then after that all happens, you give her a kiss on the lips? 
1 Upon being asked by the prosecutor whether he told E.W. "that you had seen 
hers[,]" Bird testified, "I told her that." (Tr., p.672, Ls.3-6.) However, when the 
prosecutor repeated the question, Bird claimed to not recall. (Tr., p.672, L.17 -
p.673, L.9.) 
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A. Did I what? 
Q. You gave her a kiss on the lips? 
A. Because she had a funny look on her face, and she's already 
wiped it off. And I was trying to make her feel better. And she -- either 
I kissed her on the lips, or she kissed me. I don't remember which one 
was which. 121 
Q. And after that happened --
A. Her lips were about this wide back then. 
(Tr., p.675, L.13 - p.676, L.24.) 
One day in the summer of 2009, E.W. asked her mother if she had a "wee-
wee." (Tr., p.235, Ls.16-18.) E.W.'s mother said "No, I don't, Do you?," and E.W. 
responded, "No. But the Candy Guy has a big wee-wee." (Tr., p.235, Ls.17-19.) 
Later that day, E.W. was playing with a two dolls and in E.W.'s pretend conversation 
between the dolls, her mother heard her say, "'I don't like penis candy,' and the other 
little dolls says 'I don't like it either."' (Tr., p.236, Ls.10-16.) E.W.'s mother and 
grandmother contacted the police about the incident. (Tr., p.238, Ls.2-11.) 
Detective David Hope of the Rexburg Police Department contacted Bird and later 
interviewed him on September 17 and November 20 of 2009.3 (Tr., p.447, Ls.16-23; 
p.475, Ls20-23.) 
2 Detective Hope testified that in Bird's September 17, 2009 interview at the police 
department, Bird said that after E.W. kissed his penis when he was urinating, he 
"was concerned that she might have had urine in her mouth; so in order for her not --
he didn't want her to feel bad; so [he] stated he got down on one knee and gave her 
a kiss on the lips." (Tr. p.447, Ls.16-23; p.463, Ls.17-24.) 
3 Detective Hope gave a running account of Bird's statements during the first 
interview, and a transcript of that interview was used to refresh the detective's 
memory at various points of his testimony. (See generally Tr., p.454, L.1 - p.475, 
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In Count I of an Amended Information, the state charged Bird with lewd 
conduct of a child under sixteen, for causing or allowing E.W. to touch his penis with 
her hands, and/or by causing or allowing her to touch his penis with her mouth. (R., 
p.166-167.) In Count II of the Amended Information, the state charged Bird with 
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen for "pulling [E.W.'s] pants down while she was 
lying on a couch or other furniture in his home and/or by kissing said child and/or by 
otherwise causing or having sexual contact with said child [etc.]." (R., p.167.) At the 
end of trial, the jury acquitted Bird on Count I and found him guilty on Count II --
sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. (Tr., p.189.) The district court sentenced 
Bird to a unified 20 years with seven years fixed. (R., pp.195-198.) Bird timely 
appealed. (R., pp.205-208.) 
L.19.) The second police interview was videotaped and later admitted and published 
to the jury at trial. (See generally Tr., p.475, L.20 p.487, L.20; St. Ex.9.) The 
statements made by Bird during his two interviews with Detective Hope do not 
appear to differ in any significant ways from his in-court testimony. 
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ISSUES 
Bird states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it excluded Ms. Andrus's 
testimony? 
2. Did the district court violate Mr. Bird's right to due process by 
increasing his sentence because he exercised his constitutional 
right to refuse to participate in the psychosexual examination? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, as 
an aggravating factor, Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the 
psychosexual examination, and when it imposed upon Mr. Bird 
a sentence of 20 years, with 7 years fixed? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Bird failed to meet his burden of showing the district court erred by excluding 
testimony regarding prior "inquisitive" conduct by the four year-old victim? 
2. Has Bird failed to meet his burden under the fundamental error doctrine to 
demonstrate that the district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise punished him 
for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the psychosexual 
evaluation? 
3. Has Bird failed to meet his burden of showing the district court abused its 
sentencing discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Bird Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Showing The District Court Erred By 
Excluding Testimony Regarding Prior Inquisitive Conduct By The Four Year-Old 
Victim 
A Introduction 
During trial, Gloria Andrus, one of Bird's neighbors, was asked by Bird's trial 
counsel if there had been a "playhouse" incident that concerned her. (Tr., p.558, 
Ls.4-5.) Before Bird's counsel made an offer of proof, the prosecutor objected on 
two grounds: (1) "this is prior sexual behavior that falls squarely under Rule 412, 
that it is a prior incident of a sexual nature" that does not fall within any of the four 
exceptions to that rule, and (2) it does not meet the Grist4 and 404(b) requirement 
"that the conduct in question be substantially conforming to the conduct that is being 
presented at this time." (Tr., p.558, L.24 - p.559, L.15.) Bird's trial counsel then 
made the following offer of proof: 
Your Honor, Ms. Andrus intends to testify that in late August she 
was in her home. She was -- saw [T.W.] and [E.W.] and another girl 
playing in her playhouse. She saw them through her patio door. 
She -- as she got closer, she saw [T.W.], the boy, and she saw 
his backside. His pants and shorts were pulled down to his genital 
area. From her vantage point, she could not see if his penis was 
exposed or not. 
By the time she got the sliding door unchained and opened and 
stepped out onto the deck, she saw [T.W.], the boy, had pulled up his 
pants. But [E.W.] and another neighborhood girl were pulling their 
panties down. 
Ms. Andrus will testify that she startled them by asking them if 
everything was all right. They declared it was. The girls began pulling 
their panties up. 
4 State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 (2009). 
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So Ms. Andrus will testify that she asked if they were doing 
anything wrong. They said no, and they began descending the steps 
out of the playhouse. 
They were -- and so that's the offer of proof that she will testify 
about. 
(Tr., p.559, L.21 - p.560, L.18.) Ms. Andrus was in court during the offer of proof and 
when questioned by the judge, she said she would testify as represented by the offer 
of proof. (Tr., p.561, Ls.7-11.) 
Bird's counsel argued that Rule 412 was inapplicable because the playhouse 
incident did not involve any prior sexual contact by E.W. (Tr., p.562, Ls.1-3.) Bird's 
counsel contended the proffered testimony was relevant to confirm Bird's 
"statements to the police about the child being sexually curious," to show E.W. may 
have been exposed to her brother's genitalia, and to rebut the state's assertion that 
Bird lured or commanded E.W. to touch him. (Tr., p.561, L.19 - p.562, L.6.) The 
prosecutor interjected that the offered testimony did not show "if [T.W.'s] penis was 
exposed" and that "we don't necessarily overcome the hurdle of 403, not to mention 
the fact that you have a situation under Grist that does require substantially 
conforming material." (Tr., p.562, L.15 - p.563, L.1.) Lastly, Bird's counsel 
explained that the testimony was also being offered to impeach statements by E.W.'s 
parents that E.W. had not been exposed to improper sexual contact other than by 
Bird. (Tr., p.563, Ls.7-22.) 
After considering Bird's offer of proof and the arguments of counsel, the 
district court ruled: 
It's this Court's opinion that the evidence that's sought to be 
elicited does fall within 412, and under 412, the defendant is required, 
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no later than five days before the date of trial, to provide that offer of 
proof, requesting a hearing. 
In addition, even if this Court were to expand that time frame or 
modify the time frame, the conduct that's being discussed is not 
substantially similar to the conduct the accused is -- or the defendant is 
accused of. 
And so the evidence will not be admitted under 412. 
As far as impeachment, I understand the arguments, but I don't 
see it as being offered as impeachment either. f5l 
And so the Court is going to exclude that testimony from being 
admitted in the trial. 
(Tr., p.564, L.13 - p.565, L.4.) 
On appeal, Bird argues that the district court erred by excluding the testimony 
of Ms. Andrus about the playhouse incident, contending (1) Rule 412 does not 
apply, and (2) the court "further erred by determining that the evidence was 
alternative source evidence that required substantial similarity to the charged 
conduct."6 (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Bird appears to argue that Ms. Andrus's 
5 Because Bird does not present any argument that the district court's exclusion of 
testimony about the playhouse incident deprived him of his ability to impeach the 
testimony of E.W.'s parents, that issue will not be addressed. 
6 Bird contends, "[a]lthough the district court did not specifically make a relevance 
ruling, the 'substantially similar' test is used to determine the relevance and 
admissibility of alternative source evidence.'' (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Bird then 
asserts the court erred by making any finding regarding "alternative source 
evidence." (Id., pp.10-11.) Although Bird correctly argues that the alternative source 
evidence theory of admissibility does not apply in this situation, the district court did 
not mention that theory. (See id.; Tr., p.564, L.10 - p.565, L.7). Rather than alluding 
to "alternative source evidence," the court's "substantially similar" comment appears 
to have been a reference to the prosecutor's statements that the evidence had to be 
"substantially conforming" to be admissible under Grist and Rule 404(b). (See Tr., 
p.559, Ls.5-15; p.562, L22 - p.563, L.1.) Inasmuch as the court did not consider 
whether Ms. Andrus's testimony about the playhouse incident constituted alternative 
source evidence, discussion of that theory of admissibility is not warranted. 
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proffered testimony was relevant only to show that E.W. -- not Bird -- was the 
instigator of the lewd conduct alleged by the state in Count I of the Amended 
Information (i.e., manual-to-genital and oral-to-genital contact). (See R., pp.166-167; 
Appellant's Brief, p.12 ("Rather, [the evidence] is merely relevant to the question of 
whether or not E.W. was curious about male anatomy, causing her to touch Mr. Bird 
and corroborating Mr. Bird's defense that he did not ask E.W. to touch him.").) 
However, because Bird was acquitted on the lewd conduct charge (R., p.189), to the 
extent his argument pertains to that offense, it is moot. Accordingly, the issue on 
appeal is whether the exclusion of Ms. Andrus's anticipated testimony was proper in 
regard to the charge Bird was convicted of -- sexual abuse of a child under 16 
(Count II). 
Bird's arguments fail because the district court correctly determined that the 
playhouse incident was not admissible under Rule 412. Regardless of Rule 412's 
applicability, Ms. Andrus's proffered testimony was totally irrelevant to determining 
whether the physical contact Bird had with E.W. -- pulling her pants down and/or 
kissing her on her lips (see Count 11, R., p.167) -- was accompanied with the sexual 
intent required to be found guilty of sexual abuse of a child under 16. Even if this 
Court finds that the district court erred in excluding Ms. Andrus's anticipated 
testimony, such error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. 
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). Relevance is a 
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question of law that is subject to free review. State v. Diggs, 141 Idaho 303, 305, 
108 P.3d 1003, 1005 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Excluding Testimony About 
E.W.'s Prior Inquisitive Conduct 
1. The District Court Correctly Excluded The Proffered Testimony Under 
I.R.E 412 
The district court correctly held that Bird's offer of proof about Ms. Andrus's 
testimony concerning the playhouse incident was an attempt, under 1.R.E. 412, to 
admit testimony about past sexual behavior by E.W. Bird has failed to show any 
abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to admit the offered testimony on 
that basis. 
I.R.E. 412 (a) and (b)(2) read: 
Rule 412. Sex crime cases; relevance of victim's past behavior. 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in 
which a person is accused of a sex crime, reputation or opinion 
evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sex 
crime is not admissible. 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in 
which a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past 
sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not 
admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion 
evidence is-
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence 
of-
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, 
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused 
was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of 
semen or injury; or 
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(8) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the 
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented 
to the sexual behavior with respect to which the sex crime is 
alleged; or 
(C) false allegations of sex crimes made at an earlier time; or 
(D) sexual behavior with parties other than the accused which 
occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex crime 
charged. 
Bird argues that Rule 412 is inapplicable to determining whether Ms. Andrus's 
testimony about the playhouse incident was admissible because E.W.'s conduct was 
not sexual in nature. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) He states: 
It would be absurd to categorize nudity between children of this 
age as sexual behavior. Rather, this incident speaks only to whether 
E.W. had seen male anatomy before and may have been curious 
about it. Because the evidence was not sexual behavior by E.W., the 
district court erred when it determined that Rule 412 barred the 
admission of Ms. Andrus's testimony. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Bird argues, in essence, that a victim's behavior can only 
be "sexual" under Rule 412 if the victim is mature enough to have sexual desires 
and/or intent. However, Rule 412 does not make "sexual behavior" dependent upon 
such a mental state. 
The allegation that E.W. viewed her brother's penis because she was curious 
about his anatomy asserts "sexual behavior" in a general and physical sense -- not 
because E.W. had any sexualized desire or intent, but because her behavior 
involved interest in viewing her brother's sexual anatomy. That E.W. had no sexual 
desire or intent when she possibly saw her brother's penis does not mean she did 
not engage in sexual behavior. Indeed, Bird asserted at trial that E.W.'s interest in 
seeing T.W.'s penis was relevant to show that her curiosity caused her to later have 
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physical contact with Bird's penis, which was an obvious assertion that she had 
engaged in sexual behavior towards him. Conversely, if E.W.'s playhouse conduct 
with T.W. was not sexual behavior, it could not have been relevant to show who 
instigated the subsequent sexual behavior between E.W. and Bird. 
Bird does not argue that testimony about the playhouse incident was 
admissible under Rule 412. Instead, he asserts the district court erred by 
considering the admissibility of the proffered testimony by Ms. Andrus under Rule 
412 at all. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.) Regardless, the district court correctly 
concluded, and Bird does not contend otherwise, that the proffered testimony was 
not admissible under Rule 412. The four exceptions to Rule 412's general rule of 
inadmissibility do not come close to allowing admission of the offered testimony 
about the playhouse incident -- (1) past sexual behavior regarding the source of 
semen or injury, (2) past sexual behavior offered to show whether the alleged victim 
consented to the sexual behavior, (3) false allegations of sex crimes made at an 
earlier time, or (4) sexual behavior with parties other than the accused which 
occurred at the time of the event giving rise to the sex crime charged. Therefore, the 
district court correctly determined that Bird sought to admit an incident of past sexual 
behavior by E.W. and that such behavior was inadmissible under Rule 412. 
2. Regardless Of The Applicability Of Rule 412, Because The Proffered 
Testimony Was Irrelevant, It Was Inadmissible 
Regardless of whether Rule 412 is applicable, this Court should conclude, as 
it is free to do, that the proffered testimony by Ms. Andrus was properly excluded 
13 
because it was irrelevant to any issue of consequence concerning Count II, sexual 
abuse of a child under 16. See~. 141 Idaho at 305, 108 P.3d at 1005. 
Even assuming four-year old E.W. was exposed to her brother's private 
anatomy when she presumably saw his penis and pulled her own panties down in 
the playhouse, evidence of such an event is not relevant to Bird's offense -- i.e., it 
does not have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Inasmuch as Bird admitted to having 
had the "physical contact" with E.W. he was accused of in Count II (i.e., pulling down 
E.W.'s pants and kissing her), the sole question remaining for the jury was whether 
Bird had the requisite sexual intent when such contact occurred. Evidence of the 
incident in the playhouse had no relevance to that issue. 
In order to convict Bird of sexual abuse of a child under 16, the jury had to 
find, inter alia, that he "caused or had sexual contact with [E.W.] not amounting to 
lewd conduct," further defined as "any physical contact" not amounting to lewd 
conduct with the "specific intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the 
defendant." (Tr., p.684, Ls.2-14; p.685, L.24 - p.686, L.1.) There was ample and 
uncontested evidence that Bird instigated the very physical contact with E.W. that he 
was charged with in Count II: (1) E.W.'s testimony combined with Bird's admission 
that he pulled her pants down to "teach her a lesson" that "since she had seen his 
that he had seen hers" (Tr., p.373, Ls.17-21; p.467, L.20 - p.468, L.12; p.470, Ls.18-
20; p.632, Ls.9-15; p.671, L.15 - p.672, L.6), and (2) Bird's admission that after E.W. 
kissed his penis when he was urinating in the bathroom, Bird did not want her to feel 
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bad so he "got down on one knee and gave her a kiss on the lips" (Tr. p.463, Ls.17-
24; p.675, L.3 - p.676, L.24). Ms. Andrus's proffered testimony about E.W.'s 
playhouse behavior was completely irrelevant to proving (or disproving) whether Bird 
had any of the requisite sexual intents at the time he admittedly perpetrated those 
two acts of physical contact upon E.W. Any attempt by Bird to assign responsibility 
for such conduct to E.W.'s curiosity would be specious. 
In short, this Court should affirm the lower court's decision on the basis that 
the anticipated testimony was totally irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. This 
Court will affirm an ultimately correct ruling made on an incorrect legal analysis by 
applying the correct legal analysis. Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 579, 21 P.3d 895, 
901 (2001 ). As explained above, Ms. Andrus's proffered testimony is irrelevant to 
the question of whether Bird had the requisite sexual intent for the crime of sexual 
abuse of a child under 16 when he pulled down E.W.'s pants and/or later kissed her 
on her lips. Even if the district court's analysis was wrong, its ultimate conclusion 
that the proffered testimony was not admissible is correct, and the district court 
should be affirmed.7 
D. Even If The District Court Erred In Excluding The Testimony, Such Error Was 
Harmless 
'"Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] 
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might 
have contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 
7 As the state argued at trial, testimony about E.W.'s conduct in the playhouse was 
not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) and Grist because it was not similar conduct (Tr., 
p.558, L.24 - p.559, L.15), and Bird does not contend otherwise on appeal. 
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1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 
938 (Ct. App. 1991 )). The district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding 
testimony by Ms. Andrus about E.W.'s conduct in the playhouse. However, even if 
the court erred, the exclusion of such testimony was harmless because there is no 
reasonable probability that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. 
For the reasons discussed above, the proposed testimony of Ms. Andrus had, 
at best, minimal relevance to the elements of sexual abuse of a child under 16, 
especially since Bird admitted to law enforcement and during trial that he pulled 
E.W.'s pants down and later kissed her on her lips. (Tr., p.373, Ls.17-21; p.463, 
Ls.17-24; p.467, L.20 - p.468, L.12; p.470, Ls.18-20; p.632, Ls.9-15; p.671, L.15 -
p.672, L.6; p.675, L.3 - p.676, L.24.) Adding testimony that E.W. had seen her five 
year-old brother's penis and that she briefly pulled her panties down in the 
playhouse would not have impacted the jury on the only viable issue remaining --
whether Bird had the requisite sexual intent when he engaged in such physical 
contact with E.W. There is no reasonable possibility that the lack of such testimony 
might have contributed to the conviction. Any error by the district court in excluding 
such testimony, even if deemed to have a modicum of relevance, was harmless. 
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11. 
Bird Has Failed To Meet His Burden Under The Fundamental Error Doctrine To 
Demonstrate That The District Court Enhanced His Sentence Or Otherwise 
Punished Him For Exercising His Fifth Amendment Rights With Regard To The 
Psychosexual Evaluation 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Bird contends that the district court erred by using 
his decision not to participate in a psychosexual evaluation against him at 
sentencing. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) Bird cannot show 
fundamental error because a review of the record reveals that the district court did 
not enhance Bird's sentence or otherwise penalize him for asserting his Fifth 
Amendment rights with regard to the evaluation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 
(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, "[i]t is a fundamental 
tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must be made in the trial 
court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 
3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). The appellate courts of this state will only review 
unpreserved assertions of error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry. 
150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
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C. The District Court Did Not Punish Bird For His Decision To Assert His Fifth 
Amendment Rights 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination applies to psychosexual evaluations that may be used by a district 
court to support a harsher sentence. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564, 149 P.3d 
833, 839 (2006). Therefore, a defendant may decline participation in a 
psychosexual evaluation ordered by the district court, and the court may not use 
such a decision against the defendant at sentencing. See id. 
For the first time on appeal, Bird contends the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights by using his decision not to participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation against him in making its sentencing determination. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-14.) As Bird acknowledges (id., p.13), because he failed to raise this issue 
below, he must demonstrate fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 
978. To do so, Bird must demonstrate: (1) a constitutional violation; (2) that the 
violation is clear and obvious without the need for additional information not 
contained in the appellate record; and (3) that prejudice resulted. kl Bird cannot 
demonstrate fundamental error because he cannot show from the record that the 
district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise penalized him for asserting his 
Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the evaluation. 
After the jury returned its verdicts, the district court advised Bird of his Fifth 
Amendment right to decline participation in the psychosexual evaluation and to 
"remain silent in regards to any questions ... given in that evaluation[,]" which Bird 
acknowledged he understood. (Tr., p.734, Ls.15-21.) By so doing, the court showed 
18 
that it was fully aware of Estrada's requirements, and that Bird was free to decide 
whether to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. 
At the first part of the sentence hearing, the district court said it had reviewed 
the presentence investigation report ("PSI"). (Tr., p.741, Ls.16-17.) After listening to 
the comments of both counsel and Bird, the court explained it had reviewed the legal 
objectives of criminal punishment -- protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, 
and punishment -- and the criteria for determining whether to grant probation or 
order imprisonment under I.C. § 19-2521. (Tr., p.767, Ls.3-18.) The court noted the 
support Bird had received from neighbors, but explained that the type of crime 
committed by Bird "divides families, divides neighborhoods, and divides 
communities[,]" and is not done openly. (Tr., p.767, L.25 - p.768, L.7.) In response 
to comments by some of Bird's neighbors, the court explained that even if a child is 
not properly supervised by parents, that does not mean the parents are responsible 
for sexual abuse committed by a neighbor the child has visited on their own. (Tr., 
p.768, L.8 - p.769, L.12.) The court then said: 
Psychosexual evaluations are used to determine the risk level of 
an individual in a community setting and to determine what treatment is 
necessary, if any. 
In this case, you didn't participate in the psychosexual 
evaluation, which is your right. And I have no problem with that. But at 
the same point, the evaluator indicates -- and he's correct -- that, 
without that evaluation, I don't know what your risk is to the community. 
And simply looking at, did you commit other crimes in the past, 
does that increase the likelihood that you're going to remain compliant 
with the law or decrease it? We don't know because of the nature of 
the offense in general. 
Now, if you had prior crimes of sexual abuse and those types of 
things, then I could say, by refusing the polygraph -- or not the 
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polygraph, but by refusing to engage in the psychosexual evaluation, 
obviously with those prior convictions, the risk is extremely elevated. 
But, in this case, I don't have enough information about your 
sexual history and have to, in fulfilling my obligation to protect society, 
put you at a high risk of re-offending with this type of crime in the 
future. Because I don't have any other information. And so if I'm going 
to err, I'm going to err on the side of protecting society and the 
community. There are different ways to do that. 
So when we deal with the undue risk, I can't say that there is 
an undue risk that you will not commit any further crimes. Just the 
opposite: There is a high risk that this crime could be committed 
again. 
(Tr., p.769, L.13 - p.770, L.21 (emphasis added).) On appeal, Bird contends that the 
district court ran afoul of Estrada by automatically categorizing Bird as a high risk to 
reoffend and sentencing him more harshly solely because he exercised his right to 
not participate in a psychosexual evaluation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-14.) This 
interpretation of the record is not clear or obvious, as required for a finding of 
fundamental error. 
The district court said that, in the absence of "other information" it was going 
to "put" Bird at a high risk of re-offending. The court did not say it was going to 
punish Bird more harshly because he refused to participate in a psychosexual 
evaluation. Rather, the court explained that without the pertinent information about 
Bird that a psychosexual evaluation would have provided, it was going to consider 
Bird a high risk to re-offend in order to protect society. Moreover, the court went on 
to explain: 
There's no question that mental health and substance abuse 
issues can be more successful in the community setting. And 
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depending on the risk and other factors, that may also be true for 
certain serious offenses. 
But because I don't know the risk or all of your sexual history, I 
don't know where treatment would be best. And if you refuse 
treatment, then, obviously, treatment is of no regard. 
(Tr., p. 771, Ls.9-12 (emphasis added).) The district court's acknowledgment that it 
had no information indicating treatment was a viable option for protecting the 
community did not violate Bird's rights. 
After acknowledging that it lacked information on the risk Bird actually posed 
or the treatment that would be appropriate, the court reviewed the factors relevant to 
determining whether a prison sentence was appropriate, and determined: (1) 
imprisonment would serve the purposes of deterrence, (2) Bird was not a multiple 
offender, (3) Bird's conduct caused and threatened harm to E.W., and he should 
have been aware of that fact, (4) there was no provocation or grounds tending to 
excuse Bird's criminal behavior, (5) Bird's conduct was not induced or facilitated by 
E.W. -- at the time of the offense, she was only four years old and Bird's assertion 
that she set him up was ludicrous, and his testimony was not credible at all, and (6) 
a lesser sentence than imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of Bird's 
crime. (Tr., p.771, L.9 - p.773, L.18.) The court then sentenced Bird to a unified 
term of 20 years with seven years fixed. 
The record shows that the district court based its sentence on the information 
before it, and that the lack of a psychosexual evaluation made its analysis more 
difficult by not revealing what Bird's continued risk to the public was. In addition to 
having heard the jury trial, the court stated that it reviewed the record and that it 
considered the facts of the case, the presentence investigation, the sentencing 
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criteria, and the factors relevant to determining if probation or imprisonment is 
warranted. At no point did the district court indicate it was enhancing Bird's sentence 
for declining to participate in the evaluation. To the extent the court placed Bird in 
the high risk category, it did so only because, without any countervailing information, 
it wanted to make sure the society was protected. Moreover, the evidence, including 
Bird's role as the "Candy Man" to children in the neighborhood, and his own 
admissions and testimony in regard to all counts (regardless of conviction or 
acquittal), supports the court's determination that Bird was a high risk to reoffend. 
Even if the court's determination that Bird was a high risk to reoffend played a role in 
Bird's sentence, the record does not clearly demonstrate an unconstitutional 
sentencing enhancement or constitute fundamental error - instead, it was a 
conclusion the district court drew from the record, in the interest of protecting society, 
that was not controverted by any information before it. 
Bird has failed to meet his burden under the fundamental error doctrine to 
demonstrate that the district court enhanced his sentence or otherwise penalized 
him for his decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the 
psychosexual evaluation. This Court should therefore affirm the district court's 
sentence. 
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111. 
Bird Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Bird asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of 20 years with seven years fixed upon his conviction for sexual 
abuse of a child under 16. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-17.) Bird has failed to establish 
an abuse of discretion, considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of his 
crime, the impact of the crime on his victim, and the significant danger Bird poses to 
the community -- especially young children. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review only 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 
(2007). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
Bird first argues that "the district court abused its discretion when it 
considered, as an aggravating factor, Mr. Bird's refusal to participate in the 
psychosexual evaluation." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The state's response to Bird's 
closely related argument that the court violated his Estrada rights (see section II, 
supra) applies with equal force here and suffices to show that the court did not use 
Bird's refusal to participate in a psychosexual evaluation as an aggravating factor. In 
short, the district court explained that without a psychosexual evaluation, it had to, 
"in fulfilling [its] obligation to protect society, put [Bird] at a high risk of re-offending 
with this type of crime in the future" because it did not "have any other information." 
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The court concluded that if it was "going to err, [its] going to err on the side of 
protecting society and the community." (Tr., p.770, Ls.7-13.) However, the court 
quickly clarified, "I don't know the risk or all of your sexual history, I don't know where 
treatment would be best. And if you refuse treatment, then, obviously, treatment is 
of no regard." (Tr., p.771, Ls.9-12.) The district court comments show it was 
primarily and appropriately concerned with the safety of the community, and 
recognized that, without contrary information, Bird may pose a significant safety risk, 
especially if he refused to engage in sex-offender treatment. Bird has failed to show 
that the court considered Bird's refusal to participate in a psychosexual evaluation an 
aggravating factor. 
Bird also contends his sentence is excessive because (1) he is 82 years old 
and has no past criminal convictions, (2) he "has been an upstanding citizen all of 
his life[,]" (3) he suffers from diabetes and has had six heart bypass surgeries, (4) he 
does not drink or use drugs, (5) he is financially stable, and (6) his lengthy sentence 
"ensured that [he] will mostly [sic] likely die in prison." (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) 
Bird's argument fails. 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion, the 
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence 
is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the 
sentence is excessive, Bird must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. & Idaho appellate 
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courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the defendant's probable 
term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P .2d 552 (1999). 
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568, 
574,249 P.3d 367, 373 (2011): 
There should be no limitation placed on the information presented to 
the court regarding the background, character, and conduct of the 
defendant being sentenced. In State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 
618 P.2d 759, 761 (1980), we quoted with approval from Williams v. 
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 ... (1949), as follows: "[M]odern 
concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more 
necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to 
obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to 
restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial." 
Information that a sentencing court can rely upon includes a 
defendant's past criminal behavior that resulted in a conviction, Witte v. 
United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 ... (1995); the defendant's prior 
uncharged criminal conduct, id.; and the defendant's prior conduct for 
which he was tried and acquitted, United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 
156 ... (1997). When imposing a sentence, the court is to consider 
"the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character 
and condition of the defendant," Idaho Code § 19-2521 (1 ), and it is to 
consider whether imprisonment is warranted for protection of the 
public. \ 
The nature and circumstances surrounding Bird's offense, as set forth in the 
Statement of Facts, supra, warrants the sentence imposed. In short, Bird utilized a 
position of trust, authority, and his role as "Candy Man" to have sexual contact with 
four year-old E.W. The district court reviewed the presentence investigation report, 
considered the comments of counsel and Bird, acknowledged the four purposes of 
criminal punishment, and, as set forth in section II, supra, considered I.C. § 19-2521 
and its criteria for determining whether to place a defendant on probation or impose 
imprisonment. (Tr., p.741, Ls.16-17; p.767, Ls.3-18; p.771, L.9 - p.773, L.18.) The 
court responded to letters from Bird's neighbors, explaining that their attempt to 
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blame the lack of parental supervision over E.W. for Bird's conduct was misplaced 
and that such hidden crimes often divide families, neighbors, and communities. (Tr., 
p.767, L.25 - p.769, L.12.) 
Although Bird's clean criminal record, financial stability, sobriety, and ill-health 
may be laudable and/or mitigating, those factors did not prevent him from sexually 
abusing E.W., or lead him to accept responsibility and show remorse for his crime. 
Bird told the presentence investigator: 
"But she showed up and just walked in. She did that a lot, her and her 
brother. They would just walk in and sit down. They did it all over the 
neighborhood. My neighbors started locking their doors to keep them 
out but I didn't. I wish now that I had, too. Anyway, I was standing in 
my kitchen and she came in and looked at me, then walked over and 
reached inside my pants. I was surprised. I think I told her to stop it, 
because it hurt, and we went in the living room and sat down. I was in 
my chair and she was on the couch. We watched TV for awhile. 
"Later, I went to the bathroom. The door doesn't shut all the way, 
there's something wrong with the way it fits. I was standing there, 
going to the bathroom, I wasn't done yet, and just stood there. When I 
finished, she asked if I was done, then she came over and looked at 
my penis. I'm used to living alone and I didn't expect her to just walk in 
like that. I don't know why I didn't turn away when she came in. That 
girl was well-trained by someone to know what a penis is and what to 
do with it. She knew way too much for a girl that age. And that's what 
I told her dad. 
"I think she was coached by the prosecuting attorney when we went to 
Court. I think [the prosecutor] coached her to say things. 
(PSI, p.4.) Bird's failure to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct is bad 
enough, but blaming his four year-old victim for setting him up for the sexual abuse 
charge is, as the district court characterized, "ludicrous." (Tr., p.772, Ls.16-18.) 
The court sentenced Bird to a unified term of twenty years with seven years 
fixed. The record shows that the district court based its sentence on the information 
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before it, and that the lack of a psychosexual evaluation merely made its analysis 
more difficult by not revealing what Bird's continued risk to the public was. The fact 
that Bird believes the district court should have imposed a lesser sentence does not 
establish an abuse of the district court's discretion. Because Bird has failed to 
establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion, he is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the sentence imposed 
upon Bird's conviction for sexual abuse of a child under 16. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2015. 
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